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Abstract
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) uses auctions to allocate radio spectrum
frequencies to wireless service providers. The innovation of the auction design is that it o¤ers
many heterogeneous licenses simultaneously in one ascending auction. This paper develops an
empirical model and procedure to estimate bidder valuations. Given that the complex nature of
the auction does not admit formal modeling in a general setting, I do not explore a particular model
of equilibrium bidding. Instead, I propose two revealed preference inequalities which should hold
in any reasonable model of these auctions. The rst inequality requires that a bidder never bids on
a license at a bidding price above the marginal revenue of the license where the marginal revenue
is evaluated against the set of licenses the bidder is currently winning. The second inequality
is that if a bidder bids on license A, but not on license B, the current marginal surplus from
winning license A at the bidding price is greater than that of license B. I employ an estimation
strategy that generates a map from the observed bidding behavior to a set of distributions of
bidder valuations consistent with these behavioral assumptions. A part of the strategy uses an
estimator developed by Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2006). An advantage of this estimator is that
it can accommodate a exible specication of unobserved heterogeneity. It allows bidder-license
specic values to capture private information. I apply the empirical model to an auction held in
2006. Using the estimated distribution of bidder valuations, I estimate bidder markups in order
to gauge the level of competition in this auction. The estimated bidder markups are large: the
median for local bidders such as rural telephone companies is 26%, whereas it is 31% for global
bidders such as nationwide carriers. This suggests that there were large distortionary e¤ects of
informational rents in the auction.
This paper is a part of my Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Minnesota. I am grateful to my advisor
Patrick Bajari for his continuous support and guidance. I also wish to thank Amil Petrin, Kyoo Il Kim, Minjung
Park, Tom Holmes and Bob Town, as well as participants of the Applied Micro seminar at the University of
Minnesota for their helpful comments. Of course, all remaining errors are my own. Email: jwyeo@smu.edu.sg
1 Introduction
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) uses auctions to allocate radio spectrum
frequencies to wireless service providers. There is no standard method to estimate demand
for spectrum licenses because there is no well-accepted model of bidding that captures the
complexity of the auction. This paper develops an empirical model and a procedure to estimate
bidder valuations and then applies them to a recent auction, labeled Advanced Wireless Service
(AWS)-1.
FCC spectrum auctions have attracted much attention from both policy makers and econo-
mists for the following reasons. First, spectrum auctions have become an important source of
federal government revenue through the more than 60 auctions the FCC has conducted since
1994. For example, two auctions, held in 2006 and 2008, generated a combined $33 billion
in revenue for the US Treasury. Second, e¢ cient allocation of spectrum licenses is important
because it can promote competition in the highly concentrated wireless telecommunication
industry.1
The FCC sells many licenses simultaneously in a single ascending auction. A licensee can
serve a geographically distinct area using a particular band of spectrum frequencies. An auction
proceeds in rounds. During a round, a bidder may submit bids on as many licenses as it wishes.
An auction continues until none of the bidders place a new bid on any of the licenses. At that
point, the highest bidder for an individual license becomes the winner of the license. This
unique auction mechanism, namely the simultaneous ascending (SA) auction, is one of the
most frequently cited examples where economic theories are applied to market design.2
The simple allocation rule stands at the center of the complex nature of the auction game
because it implies that licenses are priced individually although there may be complemen-
tarities among licenses. In other words, the value of a bundle of licenses may exceed the
sum of the values of the individual licenses in the bundle. In this environment, a bidders
willingness-to-pay for a license will depend on the other licenses it will win. This gives rise
to a combinatorial property on the bidders strategy: the bidder needs to consider all possible
combinations of licenses it may win when making the decision to bid for a particular license. As
a result, economic theory has not been able to characterize an equilibrium in a general setting,
and hence provides little guidance on how to interpret bid data generated in an actual auction.
1According to the US Wireless Communication Association, the wireless telecommunication industry gener-
ated $118 billion in revenue and contributed $92 billion to US GDP in 2004. According to the same source, in
2004, two rms account for 53% of all industry revenue and four rms account for 90%.
2Many leading auction theorists were involved in the design process. According to the National Science
Foundation, Paul Milgrom, Robert Wilson and Preston McAfee were the main academic contributors to the
original FCC spectrum auction design. See Roth (2002), Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), and Bykowsky, Cull,
and Ledyard (2000) for discussion on the design.
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This also makes estimating the distribution of private information on the values of licenses
extremely challenging. In the presence of complementarities, the dimension of private infor-
mation equals the number of possible combinations, 2N   1, where N denotes the number of
licenses for sale. Given that many licenses are o¤ered for sale in a single auction, this num-
ber can be very large.3 There is neither an auction theory nor an econometric technique that
enables a researcher to explore this path.
As a response to these challenges, I set a moderate goal of estimating only the set contain-
ing the true distribution of bidder valuations, while allowing private information to be specic
to each bidder and license pair. This goal is achieved through behavioral assumptions and an
estimation procedure that generates a mapping from bid data to a set of parameters consis-
tent with the assumptions. In the application to the AWS-1 auction, I test the presence of
complementarities and estimate bidder markups using the estimated bidder valuations.
This test is important because, in the presence of the complementarities, the current allo-
cation rules pose a hazard for bidders: the so-called exposure problem. As a bidder must
bid for each license before it knows whether it will win complementary licenses, it would be
exposed to a risk of nancial loss if the bidder bids more than its stand-alone value for a
license. The stand-alone value of a license refers to the bidders willingness-to-pay for a license
in the case that it wins only that license. The exposure problem can hurt e¢ ciency if e¢ cient
allocation requires the realization of complementarities. However, the exposure problem will
be relevant only if complementarities exist.
Markups measure the bidderspricing power exerted in the AWS-1 auction. In an auc-
tion game, large markups can arise because bidders strategically shade their bids below their
valuations to exert oligopsony power in the presence of private information. Especially in a
multi-object auction, the possibility that bidders can split objects among themselves at low
prices could lead to large bidder markups.4 Heterogeneity across bidders can be another source
of market power. In the AWS-1 auction, the four largest winners, which include nationwide
carriers such as T-Mobile and Verizon, won 71% of the licenses. To investigate whether these
rms faced adequate competition, I estimate the distribution of private information on the
values of the licenses and their markups.
Specifying the behavioral assumptions, I consider a bidders decision to bid on an individual
license at a given bid amount in an independent private value setting. The assumptions address
the implications of such decision on the licenses marginal contribution to the set of licenses the
3For example, as 1; 122 licenses were o¤ered in the AWS-1 auction, the number of possible combinations of
licenses, 21;122   1; exceeds the number of atoms in the universe!
4Ausubel and Cramton (2002) illustrate strategic demand reduction and Brusco and Lopomo (2002) consider
tacit collusion in this context. Demand reduction arises when a bidder prefers to bid on fewer licenses than it
desires in order to maintain low prices on the licenses upon which it is actually bidding.
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bidder is currently winning or actively bidding on. I call such set the bidders portfolio. The
marginal contribution of a license to a set of licenses is dened as the additional value from
obtaining the license together with the set. This will be greater than the bidders stand-alone
value for the license if the set contains complementary licenses.
The rst behavioral assumption is as follows. If a bidder bid on a license at the given price,
it implies that
BA1: the bidder never bid on a license more than the additional value the licence brings in
when bought together with the licenses it is currenlty winning.
In other words, the marginal contribution of the license to the portfolio at the time of
bidding is greater than the bidding price so that the bidder will earn a positive surplus if the
auction ends after the current round.
The second behavioral assumption considers a pair of licenses (A;B) and asks why the
bidder bid on license A, but not on license B, at the given prices of the two licenses. In this
case, BA2 says that this bidding decision implies
BA2: the bidder prefers winning license A to license B at the current prices and at the
current portfolio.
In other words, the marginal surplus from winning license A at the bidding price was not
smaller than that from winning license B at the price of license B if the auction ends after the
current round.
BA1 and BA2 constitute revealed preference inequalities consistent with rational behavior
that should arise towards the end of an auction. The basis for the assumptions is that the
bidder will compare the bidding price to the additional revenue from adding the license to
the set of other licenses it is winning at the time of bidding, especially toward the end of an
auction. While they have intuitive appeal, they are also weak restrictions. First, they do not
require bidders to bid up to certain values on each license. Second, the assumptions allow
bidders to engage in some collusive behavior as long as collusion occurs on a subset of licenses.
Furthermore, the assumptions hold across existing leading models of bidding, including Brusco
and Lopomo (2002), Milgrom (2004) and Zheng (2003). I provide some evidence on plausibility
of the assumptions using experimental data.
While the assumptions specify implications of observed bidding on bidder valuations, they
leave the data generating process unspecied. Therefore, they do not imply a unique distribu-
tion of bidder valuations given a distribution of bids. In other words, the assumptions identify
only the set to which the true distribution belongs. This gives rise to a set estimator.
I assume that the complementarities among the licenses in a collection are captured by a
function of bidder-collection specic characteristics. The observed bidder-collection specic vari-
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ables, however, will not be enough to account for all the determinants of a bidders willingness-
to-pay for the collection. This creates the need to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity into
the bidders value for a bundle of licenses. I allow the bidder-license specic values to represent
the unobserved heterogeneity. This exible specication of unobserved heterogeneity requires
an estimation strategy that can account for the fact that this structural error term, which af-
fects bidding decisions, enters the revealed preference inequalities generated by the behavioral
assumptions.
To estimate the coe¢ cients that govern the magnitude of the complementarities, I employ
an estimator developed by Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2006) (hereafter PPHI (2006)). An
advantage of this estimator is that it allows me to use a xed e¤ect approach to cancel out
structural error terms. The behavioral assumptions make use of the panel data structure of bid
data. It is a panel because bidders make repeated decisions to bid on the same licenses during
the auction.
Once the structural errors are canceled out, the behavioral assumptions imply conditional
moment restrictions that hold as an inequality. I use these conditional moment conditions to
construct the unconditional moment inequalities that the set to which the true parameters
belong should satisfy. After I recover the complementarities, I further estimate the distribution
of the unobserved stand-alone values of each license.
In the application to the AWS-1 auction, the estimation results reject the hypothesis of no
complementarities among AWS-1 licenses. This result is consistent with many empirical studies
on synergies among spectrum licenses.5
For the estimation of the distribution of bidder-license specic values, I divide the bidders
into two groups: global bidders, such as incumbent cellular phone carriers that operate on
a large scale like T-Mobile and Verizon Wireless, and local bidders, such as rural telephone
companies. The estimation results show that an increase in the MHz-pop of a license, the pop-
ulation of the area covered by the license multiplied by the bandwidth of the license, increases a
bidders willingness-to-pay for the license for both bidder groups. This positive marginal e¤ect
of MHz-pop on the stand-alone value of a license is more pronounced with the global bidders
for the top 50 Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)s than for the other markets. The results
also show that the further away the market associated with a license is from a local bidders
location, the greater the negative e¤ect will be on the mean value of the license.
I calculate the expected markups of the winning bidders using the estimated distribution of
5Moreton and Spiller (1998) and Ausubel, Cramton, McAfee, and McMillan (1997) nd evidence for com-
plementarities among licenses in the PCS auctions based on the reduced form regression of the winning bid
for each license on a set of regressors. Bajari and Fox (2007) also report the existence of complementarities
amongst the PCS C block licenses.
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the stand-alone value of each license. The bidder markups are high and vary a lot across winners.
While the markups of some winning bidders are barely positive, many have markups above
30%, implying that many winners paid only 70% of their values for their winning collections.
This result is consistent with the following facts. First, the auction prices were below private
transaction prices for similar spectrum licenses. Second, the number of bidders was not large
compared to the number of licenses o¤ered for sale. Despite there being over 160 bidders in
the entire auction, competition was thin. Only a few global bidders and a small number of
local bidders competed for any given license. The median for the local bidder group is 26%
whereas the median for the global bidder group is 31%. This modest di¤erence in the markups
between the two groups suggests that the bidders were horizontally heterogenous because the
complementarities were not large enough to create vertical heterogeneity.
This paper relates to the literature in the spirit of Haile and Tamer (2003). To estimate
bidder valuation in single object English auctions, Haile and Tamer (2003) specify behavioral
assumptions that are necessary conditions for a widely-accepted equilibrium, and that admit
more general bidding behavior. Their incomplete model approach has been embraced by re-
searchers who seek empirical structures to estimate bidder valuations in multi-unit auctions.
(e.g. McAdams (2008), Chapman, McAdams, and Paarsch (2006), Kastl (2006) and Hortacsu
(2002) ) This is because the theory of multi-object auctions lags far behind that of single ob-
ject auctions, which guided the standard methods of estimating distributions of valuations (e.g.
Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) and Donald and Paarsch (1993) ). Especially for spectrum
auctions, many economists agree that the interaction between the auction format and the com-
plex nature behind demand for multiple heterogenous objects does not admit formal modeling
in a general setting.6
As for the spectrum auction, the only attempt to estimate bidder valuations from auction
data was made by Bajari and Fox (2007). They estimate bidder valuations based on the
assumption that the total surplus of two bidders must not be increased by a pairwise exchange
of licenses. The main di¤erences between their work and mine lie in our respective goals
and structures of unobserved heterogeneity. Bajari and Fox (2007) employ a matching game
estimator that only uses nal allocations. This requires a more stringent restriction on the
structure of unobserved variables. The deterministic (observed) part of each bidders value
should be the major determinant of the nal allocation. My estimation strategy allows the
unobserved bidder-license specic values to be the major determinant by recognizing the panel
6Many theoretical models characterize equilibrium in a simultaneous ascending auction based on a model
with two objects. Brusco and Lopomo (2002) considers a model with two objects and two bidders and extends
it to one with two objects and N bidders. Zheng (2003) considers a model with two objects and three bidders.
To remove the exposure problem, he assumes that bidders can withdraw their bids at no cost at the moment
when jump bidding occurs.
6
structure of bid data. Their approach can be justied as they focus on ex-ante e¢ ciency
regarding the complementarities before biddersstand-alone values for each license are drawn.
My goal is to estimate the ex-post bidder markups in order to gauge the level of competition
in a spectrum auction.
This paper contributes to the empirical industrial organization literature in the following
ways. First, it contributes to the literature on spectrum auctions with a structural approach.
In contrast to Bajari and Fox (2007), who recover the complementarities only, I recover the
entire distribution of bidder valuations, more precisely a set to which the true distribution of
bidder valuations belongs. This extended recovery enables me to address issues beyond the
presence of complementarities such as bidder markups. This is the rst paper that estimates
bidder markups in an FCC spectrum auction. The large markup estimates in AWS-1 suggest
that the distortionary e¤ects of informational rents were large in the auction.
Second, this paper relates to the growing literature on partially identied models. The
applied or theoretical econometric literature on estimation and inference of partially identied
models has grown rapidly in recent years. I employ an estimator developed by PPHI (2006) and
one similar to Manski and Tamer (2002)s modied minimum distance estimator. This is the
rst paper that applies PPHI (2006) to auction estimation. Third, the approach proposed in
this paper can be modied for discrete choice problems that cannot be analyzed using standard
methods. The presence of complementarities among commodities gives rise to a combinatorial
property in a consumers choice problem. Under this environment, a consumers choice set
can be too large to admit a standard method. Fox (2007) and McCabe and Rubinfeld (2006)
consider such problems.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic rules of
FCC spectrum auctions with examples from the AWS-1 auction. In Section 3, I present and
discuss the behavioral assumptions. In particular, I test the assumptions using experimental
data. I describe the estimation approach and prove consistency of the proposed estimator in
Section 4. Section 5 provides summary statistics of the AWS-1 auction in detail and discusses
the parametrization choices for estimation. The estimation results are presented in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes.
2 FCC Spectrum Auctions
In 1993, Congress passed a bill that gave the Federal Communications Commission the authority
to use competitive bidding to allocate an initial license for the electromagnetic spectrum. Prior
to this legislation, the Commission mainly relied on comparative hearings and lotteries to select
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a single licensee from a pool of applicants for a license.
Preparing an auction to allocate licenses to use a band of frequencies, the FCC species
certain types of services for which the band should be used and some rules associated with how
it can be used. For example, the frequency band that ranges from 1710 to 1755 MHz and from
2110 to 2155 MHz, labeled Advanced Wireless Service (AWS-1), was designed mainly for the
third generation (3G) mobile phone service.
Next, the FCC subdivides the band into smaller blocks. Each block may be di¤erent in
the bandwidth. For example, the FCC divided the band AWS-1 into ve sub-blocks: A through
F. Of these blocks, A, B and F were 20 MHz wide while the remaining blocks, C and D, were
only 10 MHz wide. Blocks A, B and F, because they have twice the capacity, can potentially
handle twice the number of simultaneous phone calls, or twice the data throughput.
Each block can be licensed to a single service provider as one nationwide license, as is the
practice in many European countries. Alternatively, sub-blocks can be licensed to many service
providers, each one serving a smaller geographical region, which is more typical in the US. In
other words, a band of frequencies is not only divided by block, but also by geography. The
geographic divisions for each block can be di¤erent. For example, for the AWS-1 band, the US
and its territories were divided into 734 CMA(Cellular Market Area)s for block A while larger
12 REAG(Regional Economic Area Grouping)s for the D, E, and F blocks. Thus, allocation of
licenses to use a band of frequencies amounts to allocation of multiple heterogenous licenses.
2.1 Auction Rules
2.1.1 Allocation rule and simultaneity
In a simultaneous ascending (SA) auction, a bidder submits bids for individual licenses simul-
taneously as the auction proceeds in rounds. The allocation rule is simple: the highest bidder
of each individual license becomes the winner of the license. In contrast to this individual
pricing rule, there may be interdependency among licenses in values through super-additivity
in a bidders valuation. The value of a bundle of geographically diverse licenses is greater than
the sum of the stand-alone values of its component licenses. Particularly in the wireless service
industry, there could be several factors that lead to super-additivity in a bidders valuation:
i) existence of a minimum investment requirement for installation of infrastructure necessary
for service, ii) local synergy e¤ects in reducing system management cost and iii) advantages in
advertising as a provider of extended coverage.
This super-additivity in a bidders valuation gives rise to complementarities among licenses.
The existence of complementarities and the individual pricing rule complicates a bidders strat-
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egy. For example, even if a bidders value for a license depends on whether it wins another
license, the bidder must bid on individual licenses without knowing whether it will acquire the
other. Therefore, a bidder who has pursued a large package, but was unable to win, may be
left with a partial package whose total price cannot be justied without those complementary
licenses.
This exposure problem stands at the center of complexity of the SA auction complicating
a bidders strategy, and hence the characterization of equilibrium in a general setting. Faced
with the exposure problem, if a bidder stops bidding for a license before the price of the license
reaches its marginal contribution to the package of licenses it wins, the resulting allocation is
not only ex-post sub-optimal for the bidder but also potentially ine¢ cient.7
To mitigate the exposure problem and allow bidders to adjust bidding policies and assemble
packages as the auction progresses, bidding for all licenses opens and closes at the same time.
This rule is called a simultaneous stopping rule. A FCC auction closes after the rst round in
which no bidder submits a new bid on any license.
2.1.2 Activity Rules
By implementing the simultaneous stopping rule, the FCC has adopted an activity rule to
control the pace of an auction. The activity rule species a minimum level of activity for
a bidder in order to maintain its eligibility, which determines ability to bid on licenses in
subsequent rounds. A bidders activity in a particular round is measured as the sum of the size
of the licenses on which it is active in the round: a bidder is said to be active on a license if it
is either the standing high bidder from the previous round or placing a new bid in the round.
The size of each license is quantied as the number of bidding units. Bidding units for a license
are typically determined based on the licenses MHz-pop, the population in the area associated
with the license multiplied by the bandwidth size. For example, if a license with a bandwidth
of 20 MHz covers an area with a population of 2 million, the license is characterized by 400
million MHz-pop.8
A bidders eligibility denes the maximum level of activity the bidder can hold during the
auction. Therefore, bidders need to ensure that they have enough eligibility to cover all the
7Whether the exposure problem is a major issue is out of this papers focus and scope. Klemperer (2002)
does not include the exposure problem in his list of practical considerations in designing a multi-unit auction.
Englmaier, Guillén, Llorente, Onderstal, and Sausgruber (2009) report that in their experiments, an auction
design that imposes the exposure problem on bidders yields a higher (similar) revenue, depending on whether
bidders are experienced (unexperienced), but yields a lower allocative e¢ ciency compared to the second price
sealed bid auction without the exposure problem.
8The licenses MHz-pop is the single most important component that determines value of the license since
greater MHz-pop implies a larger pool of potential service subscribers and capacity.
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licenses they wish to purchase. A bidder can purchase as much initial eligibility as it wishes
by making an upfront payment before the auction begins. A typical spectrum auction species
the activity requirement as a percentage of the bidders eligibility. For example, the AWS-1
auction required bidders to be active above at least 80% of their eligibility for round 1 to round
30, and then above 95% from round 31 on. Whereas a bidders eligibility cannot be increased
after the auction starts, it is reduced if it violates the activity requirement. For example, in
AWS-1, the following formula is used to calculate a bidders eligibility in the subsequent round
based on its activity in the current round.
eligibility in round r + 1 = min(eligibility in round r,
activity in round r
requirement percentage in r
)
Hence, if a bidder with a eligibility of 20 million bidding units in round 25 holds an activity
level of 14 million bidding units, its eligibility will be reduced to 17:5(= 14=0:8) million bidding
units. The activity requirement typically rises as the auction progresses.
2.1.3 Information Disclosure Rule and Other Rules
Each round consists of two periods: the placement of bids or withdrawals and the announcement
of the standing high bids and other information. For auctions conducted since 1994, the FCC
has adopted the full information disclosure rule.9 Under this disclosure rule, the FCC posts all
the relevant information of the on-going auction after every round. It includes the bids placed
by each bidder on each license, the identity of the bidder, and the change in each bidders
eligibility.10
Bid withdrawals are allowed, but subject to the bid withdrawal payments specied by the
FCC.11 In the AWS-1 auction, the number of rounds in which a bidder can withdraw its
standing high bids was limited to two rounds per bidder. Withdrawals were allowed to reduce
the risk associated with e¤orts to secure various licenses in combination. Only a small number
of withdrawals, however, were placed in several major auctions including AWS-1. This indicates
that the risk to which bidders were exposed was not severe.
9An exception was made when the FCC used anonymous bidding for a recent auction, labeled 700 MHz, in
2008.
10Full information disclosure has created some concern over anti-competitive bidding. The FCC announced
it would conduct the AWS-1 auction under limited information disclosure unless the gauge of the likely level of
competition is equal to or greater than 3. This gauge was measured as the ratio of the sum of all the bidders
initial eligibility, measured in bidding units and subject to the cap, to the sum of bidding units of all the licenses
o¤ered for sale. The FCC conducted the AWS-1 auction under the usual full information procedures as the
ratio turned out 3:04.
11For the case of a single withdrawal on a license, the bidder must pay the di¤erence between its withdrawn bid
and the subsequent winning bid either in the auction where the withdrawal is made or in subsequent auctions.
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As another device for controlling the pace of an auction, the FCC species the minimum
acceptable bid for each license and round. In order for a new bid placed on a license to be counted
towards the bidders activity, it must exceed the minimum acceptable bid of the license for that
round. The minimum acceptable bid is determined by applying a minimum bid increment
to the standing high bid from the previous round. The AWS-1 auction began with positive
minimum opening bids. In AWS-1, bidders were allowed to place a bid that strictly exceeded
the minimum acceptable bid, i.e., a jump bid, by choosing from the given eight additional
acceptable bids. These additional acceptable bids were determined by multiplying and then
rounding the minimum acceptable bid by successively larger numbers such as 1.1, 1.2, and so
on. Jump bids did not frequently occur in major auctions including AWS-1. This implies the
strategic e¤ects of jump bidding, as addressed in Zheng (2003) and Avery (1998), were unlikely
to be important.
3 Behavioral Assumptions
The goal of this section is to specify behavioral assumptions that are reasonable, and that
allow for the presence of complementarities. I consider what a bidders decision to bid on an
individual license reveals about its value for the license. More specically, I relate this decision
to the marginal value of the license where it is evaluated against the set of licenses the bidder
is currently winning or actively bidding on. I call such set the bidders portfolio. Although the
bidders portfolio may not coinside with the collection of licenses the bidder actually wins at
the end of the auction, it is likely to be close to, or a subset of, the winning collection if the
auction is close to an end. In this environment, I assume that the decision of placing a bid on a
particular license implies the marginal surplus from winning the license at the bidding price is
positive, especially when it also wins the other licenses it is currently winning. I further assume
that the decision, compared to an alternative decision to bid on a license that the bidder did
not bid on, is surplus-enhancing.
The main premise behind the validity of these assumptions is that an alternative decision
does not a¤ect the nal prices of other licenses by changing how bidders play the game. I
assume that an econometrician knows a subset of licenses for which this premise is satised. I
discuss the identication of this set for the AWS-1 auction in detail in section 3:2 and test the
assumptions using experimental data in section 3:3:
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3.1 The Assumptions
Let T denote the set of licenses for sale and Vi(S) bidder is dollar valuation for collection S.
i(S) = Vi(S)  
P
l2S pl denotes is surplus from winning collection S  T given the price
of license l as pl. Bidder is stand-alone value of license l is denoted by vil = Vi(flg), which
reects bidder is prot from providing the wireless service in the area associated with license l
only. I assume that bidder is valuation for collection S can be decomposed into two parts: the
sum of the stand-alone values of the component licenses
P
l2S vil and the term that captures
the complementarities among the licenses in the collection kiS. That is,
Vi(S) =
X
l2S
vil + kiS
I assume that spectrum licenses, or a bundle of spectrum licenses, have private values so that
other bidderssignals or values do not a¤ect the bidders value for the license or a bundle that
includes the license.12 I also assume that there is no information asymmetry regarding the
magnitude of the complementarities (kiS)ST . The only private information is each bidders
stand-alone value for each license (vil)l2T . This assumption is not too restrictive because the
main sources for the complementarities are likely to be advantages in system management and
production costs due to economies of scale in the wireless service industry.
Marginal contribution of license l at collection S is dened as:
Vi(l; S) = Vi(S [ flg)  Vi(Snflg)
so that it corresponds to bidder is willingness-to-pay for additional license l if i already owns
collection Snflg. By this denition, license ls marginal contribution to any collection for bidder
i includes is stand-alone value for license l. If collection S contains a license complementary
to l; the marginal contribution of l to S will be greater than ls stand-alone value. If bidder
i wishes to purchase only one of license l and license l0, the marginal contribution of l to a
collection that includes l0 will be zero. I assume the marginal contribution of a license to any
collection is non-negative.
pilt denotes the minimum price bidder i must pay to win license l after the auction has
proceeded to round t. Therefore, pilt equals the provisionally winning bid if i is the current
standing high bidder on l in round t and otherwise the minimum acceptable bid. By denition,
12It is possible that some biddersinformation is useful to assess values of a collection of licenses to the other
bidders. In our empirical context, however, this e¤ect would be minimal because demand for wireless services of
each market can be easily analyzed without much variation and each bidder may have a very di¤erent business
plan, which likely plays a more important role in determining protability of each license.
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pilt is common across bidders except one bidder who is the standing high bidder on license l in
the beginning of round t.13 Let PiSt =
P
l2S pilt denote the minimum price bidder i must pay
to win collection S in round t. For simplicity of notation, in the following, I omit subscript
i from pilt unless I need to denote bidder i is the standing high bidder on l. I assume that a
bidder takes the bid amount for license l given as plt. This simplication is justied as most of
the bids in FCC spectrum auctions, including AWS-1, were exactly the minimum acceptable
bids.14
Hit denotes the set of licenses bidder i is provisionally winning in the beginning of round t,
and Bit the set of licenses on which bidder i places a bid during round t. Dene Ait = Hit[Bit as
the union of these two sets. I call this set bidder is portfolio in round t. The following behavioral
assumptions relate a bidders behavior of bidding on a license at the given bid amount with
the marginal contribution of the license to the bidders portfolio at the time of bidding.
Behavioral Assumptions There is round r0 and a set of licenses R  T such that if l 2 Bit;
l0 =2 Bit and l; l0 2 R where t  r0, BA1 and BA2 hold.
BA1 Vi(l; Ait)  plt
If bidder i bids on license l, the marginal contribution of the license to the portfolio at the time
of bidding is greater than the bidding price.
BA1 can be viewed as a simultaneous ascending auction analogy of Assumption 1 in Haile
and Tamer (2003). If a bidder desires a single license, BA1 corresponds to a necessary condition
for the weakly dominant strategy in a single item button auction of Milgrom and Weber (1982).
In this case, BA1 simply says that if a bidder bids on a license, the value of the license is
greater than the bid. For a bidder who desires multiple licenses, BA1 allows the bidder to
bid above its stand-alone value for the license. In this case, the bidder may incur a loss if
it eventually fails to win the complementary licenses in its portfolio at the time of bidding.
Suppose Vi(l; T )  Vi(l; S) if T  S: In this case, if a bidder somehow believes it will
win only a subset of its portfolio and hence bids based on the belief considering each licenses
marginal contribution to the subset, BA1 will be satised.
I further assume the following:
BA2 Vi(l; Ait)  plt  Vi(l0; Ait)  pl0t
If bidder i bids on license l, but not on license l0, the increase in the surplus from winning
13Milgrom (2004) terms pilt bidder is personalized price for license l in round t.
14Bajari and Yeo (2009) provide descriptive statistics on this matter. I also assume that a bidder does not
bid on licenses on which it is the high standing bidder. Bajari and Yeo (2009) report that the cases in which
the provisionally winning bidder increases its own bid in the auction are infrequent.
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license l at the bidding price is greater than that from winning license l0 at the current price of
l0. If a bidder desires a single license, BA1 implies BA2.
BA2 tries to capture the implications of the occurrence of substitutions between the
licenses a bidder bids on during the auction. If a bidder, who was previously bidding on license
l, stops bidding on l and starts bidding on license l0, BA2 will arise twice: rst, when the bidder
bids on license l, but not on license l0 and second, when the bidder bids on license l0, but not on
license l. Examining these two inequalities, the assumption attributes this switch to either (i)
the changes in the prices of the two licenses, or to (ii) the changes in the bidders perspective
on the other licenses it may win at the end of the auction.
BA2 requires that the bidders bidding decision on whether to bid on license l or license l0
should not be motivated by the decisions impact on the (nal) prices of other licenses. For
example, if the reason bidder i doesnt bid on l0 is because that would provoke retaliatory
bidding or reversion to competitive bidding that will raise prices of the licenses it desires, BA2
may not hold. This is why BA1 and BA2 are assumed to hold only for l 2 R and l0 2 R.
That is, I assume that biddersbidding decisions on licenses in R  T do not trigger intensive
competition that would otherwise not arise. To identify R  T for the AWS-1 auction, I turn
to implications of the models in the following section.
The reason why BA1 and BA2 are assumed to hold only for rounds later than round r0 is
as follows. BA1 and BA2 are based on the premise that bidder i believes the probability of
winning a license at the licenses current price is strictly positive. This may not be true in early
rounds of the auction because the prices of the licenses are relatively low. If a bidder knew
the bidding prices of some licenses would not be the nal prices, the bidder could bid on those
licenses without considering the implication of the decision on its nal surplus from winning
the licenses. An example of this kind of bidding behavior will occur if bidders delay bidding for
licenses they truly desire and bid on many licenses intermittently in order to meet the activity
rule.15 Such behavior is suppressed more e¤ectively in late rounds by relatively strict activity
requirements. Also, in later rounds, there is a high probability that the bidder wins the license
upon which it bids at the bidding price. Therefore, the risk of bidding on unwanted licenses
and the expected opportunity cost of not bidding on protable licenses will be greater in later
rounds.
15This behavior is called parking. Parking behavior describes a strategy in which a bidder, who wishes to
hide its licenses of interest until later rounds, bids for licenses it is not interested in purchasing only to satisfy
the activity requirement in early rounds. Salant (1997) documented this behavior based on his experience as a
consultant for GTE in the PCS A&B block auction. He argues that the GTE bidding team has engaged in the
parking strategy to stop other bidders observing the identities of GTEs licenses of interest and then raising
bids on those licenses to take advantage of GTEs liquidity constraint. Bajari and Yeo (2009) reports that there
is no evidence for the parking behavior in the auctions with relatively high opening bid requirements including
AWS-1.
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These assumptions will be not be informative as to the magnitude of the complementarities
if the bid amount for each license never exceed each licenses stand-alone value. Therefore,
restricting attention to only rounds after round r0 when minimum acceptable bids are relatively
large is not likely to result in a signicant loss of information.
While BA1 and BA2 have intuitive appeal, they also have the advantage of being weak
restrictions. First, they do not require bidders to bid up to certain values on each license.
Second, the assumptions allow bidders to engage in tacit collusion as long as a researcher can
separate out the set of licenses T nR on which collusion might have occurred.
If licenses are mutually substitutes and bidders bid straightforwardly as in Milgrom (2004),
the behavioral assumptions will hold. If licenses are independent in their values and bidders
play weakly dominant strategies, these assumptions will hold trivially. In this case, each bidder
will place a bid on a license as long as the bid amount is not greater the licenses stand-alone
value. The assumptions also hold in the behavior described in Zheng (2003)s Lemma 1.
They also hold in a collusive equilibrium with and without complementarities as described
in Brusco and Lopomo (2002). However, in the equilibria described in Brusco and Lopomo
(2002), bidders do not bid on a license at a bidding price that exceeds the stand-alone value of
the license. In this case, the assumptions will not be informative in detecting the presence of the
complementarities, let alone the magnitude. The models in the following subsection presents
(collusive) equilibria where bidders bid on a license at prices larger than their stand-alone values
for the license.
3.2 Discussion
Yeo (2010) provides models where bidders bid on a license at prices that exceed their stand-
alone values. In her models, bidders sequentially determine winners of licenses to facilitate
tacit collusion. As this e¤ectively removes the exposure problem, bidders later bid on licenses
whose winner have not been determined competively. That is, a collusion stage precedes a
competition stage in these equilibria. I use this implication to determine the set of licenses R
in AWS-1 to which I will apply the revealed preference inequalities, BA1 and BA2.
In the simplest case with two bidders and three object, each bidder will acquire one license
at a low price via collusion and then competefor the remaining license: each bidder will be
willing to bid up to the marginal contribution of the remaining license to its nal collection
which contains one license it has acquired via collusion. Yeo (2010) further considers models
where licenses are heterogenous and some licenses are more useful in facilitating collusion
than others so that bidders will have an incentive to determine the winners of those licenses in
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early rounds.16 By doing so, not only can bidders maximize their surpluses but also mitigate
the exposure problem. I present suggestive evidence on this point using data from AWS-1 in
the following section.
Her models also make it clear when BA2 does not hold. In the equilibria described above,
a bidder stops bidding on a license even though the price is below its willingness-to-pay. This
is because the bidder can obtain some other licenses at low prices by letting the opponent
win the license. As bidders raise their bids on the remaining licenses, the expected surplus
from those licenses that the bidder stopped bidding on will become larger than the remaining
license. However, the bidder would not bid on the license because it does not want to trigger
the competitive equilibrium. Therefore, applying BA2 to this pair of licenses will generate a
false inequality. To prevent this kind of case from arising, I assume the researcher can identify
licenses for which collusion occurs and exclude them from R.
To determine R for AWS-1, I turn to the conclusion that a collusion stage precedes a
competition stage. This is because competition occurs on the residual licenses whose winners
were not determined via collusion. I extend this implication to AWS-1.
In Figure 1 (a), the straight line charts the cumulative number of licenses that received
winning bids up until each round. The dashed line shows this information in terms of the
cumulative amount of MHz-pop. The winning bids for almost half of the licenses for sale have
been placed before round 60. It also shows that the winners for licenses with large MHz-pop
tend to be determined in earlier rounds compared to licenses with smaller MHz-pop. Figure
1 (b) presents this phenomenon in a di¤erent way. According to the gure, in early rounds,
new bids are more concentrated on licenses with large MHz-pop so that the winners of those
licenses are determined in relatively earlier rounds.
Licenses characterized by large MHz-pop include licenses that cover a broad area and a small
area with a high population density such as top metropolitan statistical areas. In theory, as
bidding on licenses with large MHz-pop requires a smaller number of licenses to be active on in
order to meet yhr activity rule, bidders could sequentially determine the winner of each license
without violating the activity rule as long as they determine the winners of those licenses rst.
Therefore, the incentive to raise prices on those licenses to determine who wins them in early
rounds will be shared among bidders.17 Also, large MHz-pop licenses can be more important
16Some licenses can be more usefulthan others because they can determine how to split multiple licenses
among bidders for them to enjoy full realization of complementarities in their winning collections. Also if
bidding on some licenses requires a smaller number of licenses to meet an activity rule, bidders could sequentially
determine the winner of each license without violating the activity rule as long as they determine the winners of
those licenses rst. In actual spectrum auctions, licenses are weighted by their MHz-pop. In this environment,
a bidder can meet the activity rule more easily by bidding on or provisionally winning those larger MHz-pop
licenses.
17Departing from the simple models, it is not clear whether bidders have an incentive to determine the winners
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in dening the areas that a bidder may want to pursue during the auction. Along with that a
collusion stage preceds a competition stage, I take this as evidence that if collusion had occurred
in AWS-1, it would be on largelicenses in early rounds. Based on this observation, I restrict
the set of licenses R for which I apply BA1 and BA2 to be the set of smalllicenses that have
received a bid from the bidder in a late round. In AWS-1, small licenses refer to CMA licenses
that divided the US into 734 small areas.
This restriction is also well suited for substitution patterns BA2 tries to capture. According
to BA2, a bidder switches to a new license only if it provides a greater marginal surplus. This
happens because prices are changing or because the bidders perspectives on the licenses it is
likely to win are changing. Suppose that a protable collection for a bidder who desires multiple
licenses changes as the bidders perceived likelihood to win large licenses changes. Under this
circumstance, the bidder may wish to delay bidding on small licenses until it is certain about
large licenses it will win in order to mitigate the exposure problem. However, the activity rule
forces the bidder to bid on small licenses as well while raising its bids on large licenses. Like
this, as the protability of collections changes, the small licenses the bidder bids on will change
as well.
Many existing models including Yeo (2010) predict that once a bidder starts bidding for a
license, it bids on the license continuously up to some price level. Although there are many
bidders who exhibit this bidding pattern in AWS-1, this is not generally true. It is observed
that some bidders bid on many licenses intermittently throughout an auction moving back
and forth from one license to another.18 The behavioral assumptions allow for such bidding
behavior. However, this kind of substitution, induced only by changes in the prices of licenses
that the bidder is bidding on, is not likely to provide information on the magnitude of the
complementarities. Therefore, when I apply BA2 to a pair of licenses, (l; l0), I require two
conditions: (i) bidder i never placed a bid on license l while bidding on license l0 and (ii)
bidder i never placed a bid on l0 while bidding on l.
It is noteworthy that the assumptions does not say anything about a bidders valuation for
a license for which it is the standing high bidder, unless it places a new bid on the license in
a round later than r0. The reason is that changes in the bidders perspectives on the other
licenses it is likely to win could drive the marginal contribution of the license below the bidding
of large licenses due to the activity rule. A bidder could meet the activity rule more easily by being the standing
high bidder on large MHz-pop licenses. On the other hand, the bidder would not be able to take advantage of a
situation in which competition over some licenses turns out to be softer than expected if it lacks free eligibility
because it is stuck with large licenses.
18One may be able to incorporate this bidding pattern by introducing liquidity constraints. If a bidder is
liquidity constrained so that it can only add one more license to the set of licenses it is likely to win, it will
have to choose one among all the licenses that have positive marginal surplus at current prices. Hence, it may
bid on several licenses intermittently.
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Table 1: License population
License A, F B, G C, H D, I E, J
POPl 1 2 3 4 5
price.19
3.3 A Test of the Behavioral Assumptions
In this section, I attempt to validate the behavioral assumption using experimental data ob-
tained by Banks, Olson, Porter, Rassenti, and Smith (2003). The data is obtained from 52
auctions. Each auction di¤ers in the number of participants, specics in the activity rules and
parameters in the complementarities. The number of bidders varied from six to eight, and each
bidder was given di¤erent complementarities parameters. That is, unlike the assumption in
this paper, the magnitude of complementarities is a part of private information. This does not
particularly hurt the validity of the estimation method in section 4 except that, in this case,
estimation should be done for each bidder and hence requires a large number of observations
for each bidder. The average length of the 52 auctions is 8.7 rounds. See Banks, Olson, Porter,
Rassenti, and Smith (2003) for more detailed discussion of the experiment.
Each auction sold 10 objects, from A to J. These objects were divided into two sets with ve
objects: A to E in T1 and F to J in T2. While the licenses in each set may be complementary
to each other, it is assumed that there are no complementarities between licenses that belong
to di¤erent sets. Bidder is valuation for a subset S = S1 [ S2 where S1  T1 or S2  T2 is
given as:
Vi(S) = Vi(S1) + Vi(S2); (1)
Vi(Sk) =
X
l2Sk
vil+
k
i
 X
l2Sk
POPl
!ki
+ki
0@ X
(l;l0)2SkSk=flg
ADJl;l0
,
2
1Aki ; k = 1; 2:
POPl denotes license ls population and ADJl;l0 takes 1 if license l and l0 are adjacent to each
other, and 0 otherwise. While the second term captures the synergy e¤ect due to economies of
19Imagine that a bidder who is the standing high bidder for license, say l1, bids on license l2 more than its
stand-alone value because license l2 is complementary to license l1 and it expected to win fl1g with a high
probability. Suppose an opponent places a new on l1 at the price that bidder i does not want to include l1 in
its nal collection any more and hence bidder i would be left with license l2 only. At the point, as bidder is
stand-alone value for l2 is less than the bid, the inequality in BA1 would not hold.
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Table 2: Test of the behavioral assumptions
BA 1 BA 2
Satised No. of new bids Round Satised No. of (l; l0)
t 78.0%
r0 = 1 95.9% 6622 r 84.4%
660
t 81.9%
r0 = 2 93.6% 4065 r 88.9%
288
scale, the third term represents geographical complementarities. Table 1 presents the popula-
tion size of all the licenses and Figure 2 depicts adjacency among the licenses.
I check whether the two behavioral assumptions in section 3 are satised. Recall that the
rst assumption says a bidder never bids on a license at a price greater than the licenses
marginal contribution to the bidders current portfolio (BA 1). The second assumption says a
license a bidder bid on has a larger marginal surplus compared to a license the bidder did not
bid on (BA 2).
Table 2 reports the results. In the table, I only considered bids that did not result in
withdrawals in later rounds. The second column shows that 95.9% of total bids satised BA
1 and 93.6% of new bids made after the rst round satised BA 1. While most of the bids
made in the rst rounds satisfy BA 1, there are eight cases in which the bid exceeds even the
stand-alone value of the license. The bidders were eventually out-bid by other bidders on these
licenses.
The fourth and fth columns show that BA 2 is less often satised than BA 1. To test BA
2, I restrict the subset for which BA 2 is expected to hold, Ri to be the set of the licenses
each bidder has bid during the auction. Especially, for a pair of two licenses (l; l0) in BA2 to
be considered, the bidder must completely stop bidding on license l before it starts bidding
on license l0: Subscript t in the fourth column denotes when the bidders bid on license l while
subscript r(> t) denotes when the bidder bids on license l0: Note that each pair involves several
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new bids on either license l or license l0. It is interesting that BA 2 is more frequently satised
with bids made in rounds represented by r than rounds represented by t. That is, if a bidder
starts to bid on a new license after it stopped bidding on some license, it is likely because the
new license is more protable than the old license. However, this does not necessarily mean
that the bidder bid on the old license in early rounds because the license was more protable
than the new licenses that it would bid later on.
These results, especially the fact that less than 90% of the observations satised BA 2, do
not invalidate the assumptions. Note that BA 1 and BA 2 do not specify explicitly how the
existence of an activity rule should be incorporated. However, for the application to the AWS-1
auction in section 5, I elaborately incorporate the rule by requiring that even if the bidder had
bid on the unchosen, alternative license, it should meet the activity rule. This treatment is
important as it is possible that a bidder bids on a license not because it would generate a
higher prot than other licenses but because bidding on the license was the only choice it could
make to satisfy the activity rule. I obtained the results in Table 2 without such a treatment
as the experimental data do not include information on evolution of the participating bidders
eligibility points.
4 Estimation Procedures
In this section, I describe the estimation procedures. I maintain the assumption that the
value of a bundle of licenses is the sum of two terms: the sum of the stand-alone values of
the component licenses and the complementarities. I assume that the stand-alone value of
each license is private information and is not observed by an econometrician. I estimate the
complementarity term and the distribution of the stand-alone values of a license separately
through two stages.
In the rst stage, I recover the complementarities by assuming the magnitude of the com-
plementarities is a linear function of bidder-collection specic characteristics. The behavioral
assumptions, together with this parametrization, lead to conditional moment restrictions that
hold as an inequality. These are used to construct unconditional moment inequalities. To
account for the presence of unobserved stand-alone values of licenses, which a¤ect the bidding
decision, I use the panel data structure of spectrum auction data. An estimator developed by
PPHI (2006) is applied.
In the second stage, the distribution of unobserved stand-alone values of each license is
estimated. The behavioral assumptions lead to inequalities that generate upper and lower
bounds of the stand-alone value of a license. The distribution of the stand-alone value is
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bounded by the distributions of these upper and lower bounds. I estimate the distribution of
the stand-alone value of each license by parameterizing the distribution as a normal distribution
with an unknown mean and variance that are functions of bidder-license specic variables. This
parametrization is necessary for the following reasons. First, observations for each individual
license are not enough to estimate the bounding distributions non-parametrically. Second, I
need to extrapolate the distribution of the stand-alone value of a large license, which is not
used in the estimation, from the distribution of the stand-alone value of small licenses.
4.1 First stage: PPHI (2006)
I begin this section by stating the assumption that parameterizes the value of a collection of
licenses to a bidder.
Assumption 1 (Parametrization) it(S) = Vi(S) 
P
l2S pl where Vi(S) = xiS0+
P
l2S vil
+is and vil is private information.
I parameterize the magnitude of complementarities among licenses in a collection S as
a linear function of a vector of bidder-collection specic characteristics xiS with dimension
1  (K   1). One of the variables in xiS captures the geographical clustering of licenses in
collection S. The term 0 denotes the true parameter value. The di¤erence between the true
value for a collection and and its parametric approximation gives rise to error. Note that
this approximation error is unknown to the bidder when it makes decisions of bidding. I let
is denote this non-structural error. Under this parametrization, omitting the approximation
error, the marginal contribution of license l to collection S is (xS[flg xS)0 + vil. Each
bidders stand-alone value for a license vil is private information and hence is not observed by
an econometrician.
Recall that bidder is portfolio in round t; Ait is the set of the licenses on which bidder i is
either standing high bidder in the beginning of round t, or places a bid during round t. Bidder
i could win Ait if the auction ends in round t+1. If the bidder is outbid on any of the licenses
in Hit, then it may win a subset of Ait.20
Note that, given l 2 S and l0 =2 S;
Vi(l; S) Vi(l0; S) = (xiS   xiS=flg)0   (xi(S=flg)[fl0g   xiS=flg)0 + (vil   vil0) + ll0s (2)
20If multiple bidders place a bid on a license at the same bid amount, the FCC applies a random tie breaking
rule to determine the standing high bidder for the license.
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where ill0s = iS  iS=flg  (i(S=flg)[fl0g  iS=flg) = iS  i(S=flg)[fl0g: I let ill0t denote ill0Ait : The
di¤erence between an approximation error ill0t and zero should not a¤ect the bidding decision.
Therefore, I assume that ill0t is mean-independent of the variables known to the bidder when
the bidding decision is made: E(ill0t) = E(ill0tjJit) = 0 where Jit is the information set at
round t including variables that characterize Ait and licenses in consideration of bidding.
The presence of the unobserved bidder-license specic value vil creates two problems. First,
since vil captures biddersprivate information, it a¤ects the bidders decision, and therefore
must have been selected from the subset of its possible values that would lead to the observed
decision. For example, bidder i will bid on l given the information available in round t only if
vil  pilt  (xAit xAitnflg)0+ ilt by BA1. For the case of spectrum licenses, the realizations of
vil conditional on l 2 Bit can be correlated with the observed variables in the information set.
The MHz-pop of a license is a major determinant of the stand-alone value of the license and
also the licenses marginal contribution to any bundle of licenses. Thus the expectation of the
structural disturbance vil conditional on the observed decision l 2 Bit can be di¤erent from its
unconditional expectation, i.e. E(viljl 2 Bit; Jit) 6= E(vil).21
To account for these problems, I exploit the panel data structure by rst-di¤erencing out
vil. The bid data from a spectrum auction has a structure similar to panel data with the same
bidder observed over many rounds, which corresponds to time periods in a panel data setting.
Let xSill0 = xS xSnflg[fl0g = (xS xSnflg)  (xSnflg[fl0g  xSnflg) denote the di¤erence in
the variables that capture the marginal synergy e¤ects of license l and l0 for collection S 3 l.
Suppose bidder i was observed bidding on license l in a round, t, before it started bidding on
license l0. If the bidder bid on license l0 in round r after it stopped bidding on l, the di¤erence
of the marginal surpluses of the two licenses to the bidders portfolio in round t and round r
are, respectively,
xAitill0 0 + vil   vil0 + ill0t
xAiril0l 0 + vil0   vil + ill0r (3)
Adding the two equations in (3) cancels out the unobserved stand-alone values of licenses l and
l0 and hence leads to
(xAitill0 +x
Air
il0l )0+ ill0t + ill0r: (4)
21To see the consequence of this selection problem, suppose an econometrician makes an assumption that
the unconditional expected value of vil is a function of observables. Due to selection on vil, the (conditional)
moment inequality implied by the behavioral assumptions may not be preserved at the true parameters if the
inequality includes only the observables that approximate values.
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For notational simplicity, letpll0t  (plt pl0t) denote the di¤erence in the minimum acceptable
bids of license l and license l0. BA2 leads to the following conditional moment inequality.
E

(xAitill0 +x
Air
il0l )0+ ill0t + ill0r   (pll0t  pll0r)j Jit; Jir
  0 (5)
The expectation is conditional on the information available in round t and r. Since ill0t and
ill0r are assumed to be mean-independent of the past, current, and future information and does
not a¤ect the bidding decision, E(ill0t + ill0rjJit; Jir) = 0.
The conditional moment inequality in (5) can be used to construct unconditional moment
inequalities. Let subscript j denote a particular bidder, license pair, round pair (i; l; l0; t; r):
Let z and zK denote random variables whose realizations are zj  (xAitill0 +xAiril0l ) and
zKj  (pll0t  pll0r), respectively. Let ez denote a random variable whose realization ezj =
(xAitill0 ;pll0t) is contained in the information set Jit in round t. Set j  ill0t + ill0r.
h+() and h () denote a real-valued non-negative and non-positive function, respectively.
Since E(h(ez)  ) = 0 for any real-valued function h(), the following unconditional moment
inequalities hold.
Proposition 1
E

hsgn(ez)  z0  zK  0 if sgn = + (6)
 0 if sgn =  
Proof follows from PPHI (2006).
h+() and h () serve as instrumental variables that preserve the direction of the inequality
sign implied by BA2. Note that I only consider observations in which I can cancel out the
stand-alone values of licenses using the xed e¤ect approach. This implies that I use a subset
of observations that can be derived from the behavioral assumptions to form the moment
inequalities in (6).22
Let Zj = (zj; zKj ; ezj) and msgnk (Zj; ) = hsgnk (ezj)(zj   zKj ); k = 1;: : :; K denote the kth
moment function. A natural candidate for the non-negative function h+k () will be h+k (ezkj ) =
1(ezkj  0)ezkj and for h k (), h k (ezkj ) = 1(ezkj < 0)ezkj where ezkj denotes the kth variable in ezj. In
this case, the number of moment inequalities equals 2K. Dene s : f+; g ! f1; 1g with
s(+) = 1 and s( ) =  1. The identied set 0 is dened as the set of parameters satisfying
22There can be multiple pairs of licenses (l; l0) that result from combining two observations from two rounds
that cancel out the di¤erences in the stand-alone values of the pair. For example, if bidder i was observed
bidding on license l1 in round t and then on license l2 and l3 in round r after it stopped bidding on l1, pair
of licenses (l1; l2) and (l1; l3) can be used for estimation. In this case, I randomly pick a pair so that each
observation corresponds to a di¤erent (i; t; r).
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all the moment inequalities. The estimate of 0 is the sample analogue of the identied set, i.e
N = argmin
2B
QX
k=1
min
(
s(sgn)
NX
j=1
msgnk (Zj; ); 0
)
given the number of observations N . PPHI (2006) provides technical conditions under which
the extreme point estimates are consistent. They also provide ways to approximate the limit
distribution of the extreme point of each coe¢ cient.
4.2 Second stage: Recovering the distribution of vil
In the second stage, I attempt to estimate the distribution of stand-alone values of license vil by
parameterizing the distribution.
If bidder i bids on license l in round t, the net marginal contribution of the license to the
bidders portfolio at the price of the license in round t is
(xAit xAitnflg)0 + vil + ilt   plt  0 (7)
Note that the behavioral assumptions only imply the value of the equation in (7), which
includes a realization of the approximation error, is greater than zero. Therefore, only a lower
bound of the sum of the two unobservable variables can be computed.
If bidder i was observed being outbid on license l in round    1 and never bidding on a
new license that may replace l as a special case of BA2,
(xAi xAinflg)0 + vil + il   pl  0 (8)
Hence, once the coe¢ cients that govern the magnitude of the complementarities are esti-
mated, the inequalities in (7) and (8) can be used to estimate the distribution of vil+ . As (7)
and (8) give a lower and upper bound of a realization vil +  of a random variable vl + , one
can estimate bounding distributions of its distribution non-parametrically if there are enough
observations that lead to inequalities similar to (7) and (8) for the same license l.23 However,
23Another way of constructing an inequality that gives an upper bound for the stand-alone value of a license
is to combine two inequalities from the modied BA2. Suppose bidder i had stopped bidding on l1 before it
started bidding on l. If the bidder bid on license l in round r, the following inequality holds by BA2:
xAir   xAirnfl1g[flg

0 + vil1   vil + il1lr  pl1r   plr (i)
Adding (i) and (8) gives
0

xAir   xAirnfl1g[flg + xAi xAinflg

+vil1  pl1r   plr+pl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in a typical spectrum auction, only a few bidders bid on the same license and therefore it
is practically infeasible to estimate the distribution of the stand-alone value of each license
non-parametrically. To resolve this problem, I make the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (Distribution of the stand-alone value) vil is drawn independently over
licenses and bidders from an normal distribution (il; 
2
il) with il = 
1
0z
1
il
and il = 20z
2
il: Also, "S is
independently drawn from an identical normal distribution (0; #2).
The distribution of the stand-alone values of a license is normal with a unknown mean
and variance. The mean and standard deviation are assumed to be functions of bidder-license
specic characteristics. There is another reason why this assumption is necessary, beyond a
limited number of observations for each license: As I only consider smalllicenses, I have to
extrapolate the distribution of the stand-alone value of a largelicense from as a collection of
smalllicenses. Note that this assumption was not needed for the rst stage estimation. As
I cancel out the stand-alone values, the rst stage is free from any parametric assumption on
the distribution of vl.
As only a set to which the true parameter 0 belongs is identied by the model, for each
 2 0, there will be corresponding (7) and (8). Dene 0S;l = argmin
20
 
xS[flg xSnflg

 and

0
S;l = argmax
20
 
xS[flg xSnflg

. Then, I obtain the following inequalities.
vil + ilt  plt   (xAit xAitnflg)0Ait;l (9)
vil + il  pl  (xAi xAinflg)
0
Ai ;l
(10)
Let wq  vil+ilt: Note that the mean of this random variable is il = 10z1il and the variance
is e2il = 2il + #2. Letting q denote a distinct bidder-license-round pair (i; l; t) and uq the right
hand side of (9) and dq that of (10) gives
dq1  wq1 ; wq2  uq2
Suppose the true parameters 0 = (
1
0; 
2
0) are known. I can standardize uq; vq and dq by
subtracting the mean q of the distribution of wq from each of them and then dividing it by
the standard deviation q of wq:
dq1   q1
q1
 wq1   q1
q1
;
wq2   q2
q2
 uq2   q2
q2
(11)
A lower bound for license l1 can be constructed in a similar way.
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Let u denote the standardized random variable whose qth realization is uq =
uq   q
q
. I dene
d and w similarly.
(11) holds for any q and q. Since the random variable wq follows a normal distribution
wq  (q; e2q), the distribution of w will follow the standard normal distribution at the true
parameter 0 = (
1
0; 
2
0). Therefore, at the true parameter 0 = (
1
0; 
2
0); the distribution
of u stochastically dominates the standard normal distribution and the distribution of d is
stochastically dominated by the standard normal distribution.
Let G denote the distribution of d and G the distribution of u. Given 0, at the true
parameter 0, G(t; 0;0)  e	t0;t1(t)  G(t; 0;0) for all t 2 [t0; t1] where e	t0;t1 denotes the
standard normal distribution truncated above t0 and below t1. Note that the values of wq that
satisfy the inequalities in (9) and (10) must have been selected from the whole support of its
distribution. For example, if a bidders stand-alone value for a license is very large, the bidder
will not stop bidding for the license, and hence its upper bound will never be observed. The
fact that each random variable follows a truncated normal distribution will cause the standard
normal distribution constructed from the variables to be truncated. Therefore, the identied
set  0 is dened as:
 0 = f 2  jG(t; 0;0)  e	(t)  G(t; 0;0) 8 t 2 [t0; t1] g
Following Manski and Tamer (2002),  2   minimizes the following criterion function if
and only if  2  0:
Q(r; ) =
Z t1
t0

min

(t; ; ); 0
2
+min

(t; ; ); 0
2
de	(t) (12)
where (t; ;)  G(t; ;) e	t0;t1(t) and (t; ;)  e	t0;t1(t) G(t; ;) where  = (;t0; t1).
To estimate  0, dene bS;l = argmin
2N
 
xS[flg xSnflg

 and bS;l similarly. An estimate bdq of
dq can be obtained by replacing 
0
Ait;l
with b
Ait;l
and an estimate buq of uq can also be similarly
obtained. Let bG(;N ; ) denote the empirical distribution function of bdq and bG(;N ; ) of buq.
Let n2 denote the number of observations used for the construction of the empirical distrib-
utions bG(;N ; ) and bG(;N ; ): Dene n = (N; n2). The second stage estimator is obtained
by minimizing the sample analogue of (12):
QnI (;bn) = 1nI
nIX
k=1

min
nbn2 (tk; ;bn); 0o2 +minnbn2 (tk; ;bn); 0o2

(13)
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To establish consistency of the estimator, I assume:
Assumption 3 (i) The t1; t2; : : : ; tnI 2 [t0; t1] are i.i.d. draws from e	.
(ii) As N  !1; both n2; nI  !1
(iii) The set    RM is compact
(iv) bt0 and bt1 are a consistent estimate of t0 and t1, respectively.
Dene
 N =

 2  
 bQnI (;bn)  minr2 Qns(;bn) + N

(14)
and let ( ; 0)  sup2  inf02 0 j   0j measure the distance between two sets  ; 0  RM .
The following proposition establishes consistency of the estimator.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 3, ( N ; 0)
P ! 0.
Furthermore, if sup
2 
 bQn(;bn) Q(; ) N , then ( 0; N) P ! 0
Proof See Appendix.
5 Application to AWS-1
This section describes the AWS-1 and provides some summary statistics. I also discuss the
parametrization choices that I make when applying the estimation technique to AWS-1.
5.1 AWS-1
The AWS-1 auction began in June 2006 and ended in September 2006 after 161 rounds. The
auction was designed to provide an additional spectrum ranging from 1710-1755 MHz and 2110-
2155 MHz to wireless service providers wishing to o¤er a variety of wireless services, including
Third Generation (3G) mobile broadband and other advanced wireless services. The FCC
o¤ered 1; 122 licenses, with 13.7 billion MHz-pop, for sale and 168 bidders participated in the
auction. The auction generated $13:7 billion of revenue for the US Treasury after 104 bidders
won 1; 087 licenses. The average price per MHz-pop was $0:533.
Table 3 presents the licenses o¤ered for sale in detail. The FCC divided the 90 MHz of
spectrum into 6 frequency blocks, listed as A through F. To dene coverage of a license in each
frequency block, the FCC used various denitions of geographical service areas. For Block A,
the FCC used the market denition of Cellular Market Area (CMA)s, which consist of 306
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Table 3: Licenses o¤ered for sale in AWS-1
No. of licenses Total Price per
o¤ered (sold) MHz-popa
Revenueb
MHz-pop
1; 122 (1; 087) 25:706 13:7 $0:533
Blocks No. of licenses o¤eredGeographic Service Areas
(size of bandwidth) for each block
MSA or RSA A(20) 734
Basic Economic Area (BEA) B(20), C(10) 176
Regional Economic
Area Grouping (REAG)
D(10), E(10), F(20) 12
a: in billions. b: in billion dollars
MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area)s and 428 RSA (Rural Service Area)s on the basis of the
1980 Census. For block B and C, the FCC applied a service area map called Basic Economic
Area (BEA), which divides the US and its territories into 176 areas. For the remaining blocks,
Regional Economic Area Grouping (REAG) which includes 8 service areas in the continental
US and 4 in its territories was used to dene coverage of spectrum licenses.
Out of 168 bidders who made an upfront payment for eligibility, 164 bidders actually par-
ticipated in the auction placing at least one bid throughout the auction. Small bidders were
awarded discounts (bidding credits) on their winning bids: 15% for small business and 25% for
very small business.24 Out of 164 bidders, 44 were awarded 15% bidding credits and 54 bidders
25% bidding credits.
Throughout 160 rounds, 16; 197 total bids were placed on 1; 092 licenses, averaging 14:8
bids on a license. There were 159 licenses that received only one bid. Bid withdrawals were not
frequent only 11 bidders made 26 bid withdrawals in total, resulting in ve licenses unsold
and eight licenses sold but subject to the withdrawal payments.
The AWS-1 auction opened with relatively high minimum opening bids compared to previ-
ous auctions. The minimum opening bids were as large as 45% of the nal prices on average
with a median of 32:6%. However, as many licenseswinning bids were much larger than their
minimum opening bids, the sum of the opening bids was only 8:4% of the sum of the nal
winning bids. Although the FCC provides nine acceptable bids for each license each round,
most of the bids were exactly the minimum acceptable bids accounting for 98:5% of the total
bids placed. Only 1:1% (240 bids) exceeded the minimum acceptable bids by more than 5%,
and 31 bids out of these 240 jump bids became the winning bids.
24Very small business and small business were dened as business whose average gross revenue for the pre-
ceding three years did not exceed $15 million and fell in between $15 million and $40 million, respectively.
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Table 4: Major winning bidders in AWS-1
T-Mobile SpectrumCo Verizon Cingular Sum of top 4 Others
MHz-popa 6.64 5.27 3.84 2.44 18.18 7.36
Net paymenta 4.18 2.38 2.81 1.33 10.70 3.00
Price per
MHz-pop
0.63 0.45 0.73 0.55 0.59 0.41
Percentage
of MHz-pop
25.99% 20.62% 15.04% 9.54% 71.19% 28.81%
a: in billions.
Table 4 presents the 4 biggest winners in AWS-1 with an emphasis on the asymmetry
amongst winners. The 4 biggest winners accounted for 71% of the total units of MHz-pop
sold and 78% of the total revenue. T-Mobile was the biggest winner in terms of both units
of MHz-pop contained in the winning collection accounting for 25:99% of the total amount of
MHz-pop sold and the net payment. Only 11 bidders, including the 4 biggest winners, won
more than 1% of the total MHz-pop sold and the rest, 93 bidders won 0:64% of MHz-pop sold
on average.
The activity requirement for AWS-1 was 80% of the bidders eligibility until round 30; from
which point it then became 95%. As a result of the activity rule, the number of qualied
bidders who were holding a positive amount of eligibility gradually decreased. At about round
30, only 136 bidders out of the originally qualied 168 bidders remained qualied.
5.2 Parametrization: complementarities
As the geographic licensing schemes used to divide the US and its territories are di¤erent for
each frequency block, the geographic size of a license exhibits a large amount of variation across
frequency blocks. Given this, it is not clear what the stand-alone value means for a license that
covers a large area that can be covered by a collection of several small licenses. For example, if
there are positive complementarities among CMA licenses that belong to the same BEA, the
stand-alone value of the BEA license must include these complementarities.
To be consistent across frequency blocks, I let a licensedenote a CMA license. A large
license, such as a BEA or a REAG license, is dened as the collectionof the CMA licenses
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that belong to the large area.25Formally, the stand-alone value is dened as follows:
vil = Vi(flg) if l is a CMA license
Therefore, the value of a BEA or a REAG license is
Vi(flg) = Vi(Cl) =
X
l02Cl
vil0 + kiCl if l is either a BEA or a REAG license
where Cl = f l0 2 T j l covers the CMA area associated with l0g and kiCl denotes the comple-
mentarities amongst the CMA licenses that belong to Cl.
With this denition, I convert any collection of licenses into a collection of CMA licenses
with the bandwidth size and population adjusted appropriately. For example, if a bidders
collection contains one 10 MHz BEA license which covers CMA160 and some part of CMA360,
and a 20 MHz CMA license, say CMA361, the converted collection will be the collection of 20
MHz CMA361, 10 MHz CMA160, and 10 MHz CMA360 that contains only the right portion
of the whole population of CMA360. A collection of licenses hereafter refers to the converted
collection.
For complementarities, I construct two variables. The rst variable captures synergies
achieved through common ownership of geographically close licenses. Geographic complemen-
tarities may arise due to the presence of the minimum investment requirement for infrastructure
deployment, and hence economies of scale, or advantages in advertisement and the licensees
market position as a network operator with extensive and continuous geographic coverage. The
presence of geographic complementarities is well documented by several empirical studies. The
pairwise geographic synergies between two licenses will be positively related to the capacity-
adjusted population size (MHz-pop) of the two areas and negatively to the distance between
the two areas as noted by Moreton and Spiller (1998). The variable is constructed as follows:
geocompleS =
X
l2S
X
l02Snflg
MHz-popl(MHz-popl0)
1=2
d2l;l0
where Sl = f l0Snflgj l and l0 belong to the same stateg. dl;l0 denotes the distance between the
area associated with license l and the area associated with license l0. The distance between two
CMA areas, say l and l0, was measured as the minimum distance between a county in l and a
25To be precise, the building blocks for BEAs and REAGs are not CMAs but counties. Counties are also the
basic building blocks for CMAs. It occurred therefore, though not often, that two counties that belong to one
common CMA belong to two di¤erent BEAs or even two di¤erent REAGs. Whenever this occurs, I adjust the
large license to contains the right portion of the CMA license.
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county in l0. This variable is more conservative than the one used in Bajari and Fox (2007). The
pairwise complementarities between two licenses l and l0,
MHz-popl(MHz-popl0)
1=2
d2l;l0
, is positive
only if the two licenses belong to the same state.
This conservatism is appropriate due to the following reasons. First, many large bidders
in AWS-1 were already operating a wireless network regionally or nationally before the auc-
tion. For these bidders, the presence of the minimum investment requirement for infrastructure
deployment, and hence economies of scale is not likely to be a factor that constitutes comple-
mentarities, and global synergy e¤ects should be addressed in combination with their current
holdings of other spectrum licenses. Second, small bidders such as rural telephone companies
tend to bid on several licenses contained in one or two states. This indicates that a rm may
not need more than several CMA licenses to achieve an e¢ cient scale of operation. Based
on these considerations, I conclude that the more important factor for geographic synergies is
advantages in advertising, market position and network management. These are likely to be
achieved at the state-level where wireless industry regulation is shared.
The second collection-specic variable is constructed by summing the pairwise comple-
mentarities that measure how close two CMAs are in terms of travelers over licenses in the
collection.
travelcompleS =
X
l2S
X
l02Snflg
tl;l0MHz-popl(MHz-popl0)
1=2
where tl;l0 =
Number of passengers with origin l and destination l0P
l02T
Number of passengers with origin l and destination l0
measures the relative
importance of an area l0 as destination of trips from area l.
This was constructed using T-100 Domestic Market Airline Tra¢ c Data for the calendar
year 2005. The data includes passenger counts enplaned at the origin airport and deplaned at
the destination airport reported by U.S. air carriers operating between airports located within
the boundaries of the United States and its territories. Recognizing there are multiple airports
within a CMA, I aggregate passenger counts at the CMA level. This variable captures synergies
that may arise from serving traveling customers without charging extra for roaming service.
It also lls in the global synergy e¤ects left out by the rst variable that only accounts for
state-level local synergy e¤ects.
Note that the complementarities are common across bidders by the construction of the
complementarity variables. The reason for this specication is because I do not have data
that captures bidder heterogeneity relevant to synergy e¤ects. The estimation procedure allows
complementarity variables to di¤er across bidders. This specication, however, is plausible since
main sources of the complementarities are likely to be properties of wireless service production
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Table 5: Explanatory power of a complementarity variable on the last bids
Round at which the
rst bid is placed
No. of obs. R2(1) R
2
(2) R
2
(2)  R2(1) (R2(2)  R2(1))=R2(1)
all ( > 0) 2275 0:586 0:598a 0:012 0:020
> 10 1702 0:634 0:655 0:021 0:033
> 20 1206 0:555 0:648b 0:093 0:168
> 30 670 0:718 0:818 0:100 0:139
> 40 362 0:667 0:822 0:155 0:232
> 50 248 0:617 0:792 0:175 0:284
All licenses except the CMA licenses over the US territories were used for regression. All the
coe¢ cients are statistically signicant and positive except the rst and third regression of (2) where
a: the coe¢ cient for travelcomple is not signicant and b: the coe¢ cient for geocomple is negative.
technology, and consumersstrong preferences for seamless services as discussed above.26 This
assumption implies the sources of variation in the collection of licenses each bidder pursues are
random draws for stand-alone values of licenses that are privately observed.
5.2.1 Bidding above the stand-alone values
Recall that BA2, per se, does not require a bidder to bid above the stand-alone value for a
license before it stops bidding on it. Even in the case where the licenses marginal contribution
to the bidders portfolio is greater than the licenses stand-alone value, the bidder does not need
to bid up to the marginal contribution before it drops the license. However, either if the bidder
never bids above the stand-alone value of a license, or if it never considers the marginal synergy
e¤ect of the license on its portfolio, BA2 will not be informative as to the magnitude of the
complementarities. Table 5 provides evidence that suggests the maximum bid submitted by a
bidder on a particular license is positively correlated to the licenses marginal synergy e¤ect on
the bidders portfolio. Furthermore, this relationship is more pronounced in later rounds.
Table 5 compares two sets of regressions in which each regression considers only a subset
of observations. Let bril denote the maximum bid amount placed by bidder i on license l. Let r
denote the round when the maximum bid was placed. Note that there is only one observation
for a bidder-license pair because the round when the bidder bid on the license at the maximum
bid amount is unique for each pair.
26Brusco and Lopomo (2002) argue that what matters for signaling incentives is not the existence of com-
plementarities but whether the complementarities are common across bidders or not. Intuitively, as common
complementarities can be fully competed away in a competitive equilibrium, the existence of common com-
plementarities does not destroy incentives to collude. By assuming commonness in the magnitude of comple-
mentarities, we lose an opportunity to test, for example, whether variability in the complementarities is large
enough to prevent a rise of a collusive equilibrium.
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The rst set (1) regresses the maximum bid submitted by a bidder for a license on a constant
and the licenses MHz-pop:
(1) bril = (1) + (1)MHz-popl + "il
The second set (2) regresses the maximum bid on a constant, the licenses MHz-pop, and two
variables that capture the marginal synergy e¤ect of the license on the bidders portfolio in the
round when the maximum bid was placed:
(2) bril = (2) + (2)MHz-popl + 
geo(geocompleAir   geocompleAir=flg)
+tra(travelcompleAir   travelcompleAir=flg) + e"il
To see whether the licenses marginal synergy e¤ect on the bidders portfolio has a larger
e¤ect on the bidders bidding decision in later rounds, I divide the observations into several
groups by the round of the bidders rst bid. Except the rst row, each regression includes a
subset of the observations depending the rst-bid rounds.
The regression results in Table 5 suggest that the marginal synergy e¤ect of a license to a
bidders portfolio has a positive e¤ect on the maximum bid submitted by the bidder on the
license. They also show that the additional explanatory power of the marginal synergy e¤ect
variables on the maximum bid amounts, R2(2)   R2(1), tends to grow larger as the regression
includes only the licenses chosen by bidders in later rounds.
This result is consistent with my argument that in late rounds, bidders consider their port-
folios as the set of licenses it is likely to win. Otherwise, the marginal synergy e¤ect of the
license on the bidders portfolio would not have any information on the maximum bid amounts.
Also, it supports the fundamental assumption of this paper that biddersdecisions to bid on
individual licenses reveal information on the magnitude of the complementarities.
5.3 Parameterization: distribution of stand-alone values
For the second stage estimation, I divide the bidders into two groups: local bidders and global
bidders. As the FCC o¤ered licenses in various sizes in AWS-1, participating rms also varied
in size and business plan. It is hard to imagine that national wireless carriers such as Verizon
and T-Mobile or the joint venture SpectrumCo, which includes Comcast, Time Warner and
Cox, and Sprint Nextel, would have business plans similar to a local telephone company or a
local Internet service provider with an average gross revenue around $20 million. To account
for this obvious asymmetry, I call a bidder a local bidder if either the bidder classied itself as
a rural telephone company in the application form submitted to the FCC or if the bidder has
bid for a smaller collection of licenses that cover a conned region of up to ve states. Out of
164 bidders who placed a bid, 72 identied themselves as a rural telephone company and 44
bid on only one or two licenses conned in one state throughout the auction. These bidders are
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Table 6: Global vs. local bidders
Initial ActivityType No. of bidders Bidding credit
eligibility ratio (billion MHz-pop)
Global 25 0:082 0:123 1:29
Local 135 0:128 0:00048 0:009
Initial eligibility ratio of bidder i is dened as the ratio of bidder is initial eligibility to the
amount of bidding units required to purchase all the licenses o¤ered for sale in AWS-1.
classied as local bidders. Besides these bidders, 19 bidders who bid on licenses within several
nearby states were also counted as a local bidder.27 Table 6 presents some summary statistics
of the two bidder groups. It shows that the local bidder bidders, on average, began with a
lower level of eligibility, compared to the global bidders. Many of them were also awarded some
bidding credits.
Following Section 4, the mean of the distribution of a licenses stand-alone value is assumed
to be a linear function of variables that a¤ect the value. The mean and standard deviation of
the distribution of stand-alone values for license l to bidder i is parameterized as:
il = 
j
1MHz-pop
e
il + 
j
2Distil + 
j
3Areal (15)
il = 
j
MHz-pop
e
il + #
j; j = local, global
A positive coe¢ cient for MHz-pop captures the marginal increase in the average value of a
license due to the increase in the number of potential subscribers in the market, multiplied by
the bandwidth of the license. The bandwidth of a license corresponds to the capacity of the
license which determines the number of simultaneous phone calls it can handle. The MHz-pop
of a license is expected to be an important determinant of the value of the license.
MHz-popeil denotes eligibility-adjusted MHz-pop. Admittedly, the covariates in (15) are not
enough to account for various business plans of the AWS-1 participants. This will result in a
large variance estimate in (15). This is especially the case for the local bidder group. Although
they are grouped together as local bidders, the group includes very small bidders who bid only
on one license throughout the auction as well as others who have won licenses over several states.
To account for this di¤erence, MHz-popeil instead of MHz-pop is used for estimation. MHz-
popeil is dened as MHz-pop
e
il MHz-popl eligi where eligi = log(1 + 104  eligibility ratioi)/ 4 if
i is local and 1 otherwise. The numerator of 4 ensures that a local bidders MHz-popeil is less
27Four bidders who bid on only one to three licenses conned to a small area in the US territories, such as
Puerto Rico, are classied as neither a local nor a global bidder, and hence are not considered.
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than MHz-popl.28
Distil denotes the distance in meters between license l and the CMA area of bidder is
address on the application form submitted to the FCC. If a local bidder values a license close
to its business address more than a distant license, the coe¢ cient should be negative. I as-
sume the coe¢ cient for this variable is zero for the global bidder group. This assumption is
plausible because the global bidders, which include nationwide cellular phone carriers, will not
particularly value the licenses close to their headquarters. If the coe¢ cient of Distil is negative,
the model will predict that a local bidder will pursue a smaller collection compared to a global
bidder on average even if all other coe¢ cients are the same.
I attempt to capture the cost side e¤ect on a licenses value by including Areal. The number
of base transceiver stations for a region depends on the density of subscribers, the regions area
and terrain. A base station is limited in the number of simultaneous phone calls it can deal
with and the area it can cover. Therefore, the area of a region will a¤ect the wireless service
production cost for the market.29
The variables in (15) are expected to be related to a licenses value positively, or negatively,
depending on what each variable is intended to capture. However, if these variables are also
correlated to competition level, then it is not clear what sign to expect since we are missing the
data on competition level for each market. I allow the parameters in the mean and standard
deviation to di¤er depending on whether the CMA license is associated with MSA or RSA for
the global bidder group. I could not do so for the local bidders because of two few second stage
observations.
5.4 Choice of moments
To estimate the coe¢ cient for the complementarity variables in the rst stage, I use six moment
conditions, each of which holds as an inequality. Let S denote a set of licenses. Suppose that
bidder i bids on license l in round t, but not on license l0.
Dene geocompleSll0 geocompleS[flg geocompleSnflg[fl0g, and travelcompleSll0 similarly.
Following the notation in Section 4.1, let ez1; ez2, and ez3 denote the vectors of geocompleAitill0 ,
travelcompleAitill0 and pll0t, respectively.
The set of the instrumental variables, given as h+() and h () in (6), that I used to construct
28The specic functional form of an eligibility ratio, log(1+104eligibility ratioi), is chosen to reduce variation
of MHz-popeil resulting from large di¤erences in local bidderseligibility ratios.
29The current specication does not include the population density, the interaction term of population and
area as an determinant of the value of a license. The wireless service technology predicts that while the
population density is more important in determining the number of base stations for most urban regions, the
area is more important in rural regions.
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the six moment conditions are f(ezj  0; ez3  0)ezj; (ezj  0; ez3 < 0)ezj; (ezj < 0)ezjgj=1;2. These
instrumental variables are chosen to ensure that the estimated set satisfying all the moment
inequalities is non-empty. The estimated set resulting from more natural moment conditions
constructed by f(ezj  0)ezj; (ezj < 0)ezjgj=1;2;3 is also non-empty, and is smaller. However, I use
the formal moment conditions. This choice ensures that bG stochastically dominates bG because
the formal moment conditions yield a slightly bigger set, which contains the estimated set from
the latter moment conditions.30 Given the nite number of observations, I conclude that this
conservative approach to estimate the set containing the true parameters is appropriate.
I choose round 31 as r0 from which the inequalities in BA1 and BA2 are satised. I choose
round 31 because the activity requirement had increased to 95% from round 31, and therefore
bidders could not delay bidding for licenses that they desire. The regression results in Table 5
also support this choice.
I make several further restrictions on the pair of licenses (l; l0) for which the revealed pref-
erence inequalities in BA2 should hold. First, I restrict the pair of licenses (l; l0) to be the same
type of CMA licenses. That is, if license l is a MSA license, l0 should be also a MSA license,
and if l is a RSA license, l0 should be also a RSA license. This restriction reduces the number
of observations, but reinforces the substitution motivation that BA2 tries to capture.
Second, choosing between license l and license l0, the decision should not be inuenced by
considerations of current and future eligibility. I require that bidder is eligibility level in round
t does not prevent bidder i from bidding on license l0. I further require that if bidder i bids on
license l0, this alternative decision should not violate the activity requirement. This restriction
controls for the fact that the behavioral assumptions do not explicitly account for the activity
rule.31
6 Estimation Results
Table 7 presents the rst stage estimation results. The coe¢ cients in the complementarities
are both positive. The rst panel provides the interval estimate and inference for the true
parameter 0 for each coe¢ cient while the second panel provides for the extreme values of each
coe¢ cient. Since zero lies outside of the 95% condence interval (CI) for each coe¢ cient, the
null hypothesis that any of these complementarity variables has no e¤ect on bidder valuations
30A violation of the stochastic relationship between bG and bG does not imply misspecication, given the
nite number of observations.
31Suppose that bidder i bids on license l; but not on license l0 because either the bidder was not eligible for
license l0 or it could have not met the activity requirement by bidding on license l0. In this case, the premise
of BA2 is not satised because the alternative decision would change the distribution of the set of licenses that
maximizes bidder is surplus at each nal price vector.
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Table 7: First Stage Estimation Results
Interval Estimate Min. Max.
geocomple [4:92, 67:25] 4:92 67:25
simulated 95% CI [2:63, 127:53] [2:63, 26:27] [6:65, 127:53]
conservative 95% CI [ 10:48, 129:69] [ 10:48, 80:78] [ 97:52, 129:69]
travelcomple [0:008, 0:123] 0:008 0:123
simulated 95% CI [0:005, 0:131] [0:005, 0:010] [0:0144, 0:125]a
conservative 95% CI [ 0:053, 0:237] [ 0:053, 0:011] [ 0:187, 0:236]a
All gures are in thousandths (10 3). The simulated CIs are based on 10,000 simulation draws. a
reports the 90% condence interval. To simulate the distributions that dominates and is dominated
by the true distribution, I used the same set of moment inequalities.
is rejected at the 5% signicance level when tested using the simulated distribution. I also
reject the hypothesis that the minimum and the maximum of each coe¢ cient is zero at the 5%
signicance level with one exception. The maximum of the travel complementarities coe¢ cient
is only signicant at the 10% level.
I fail to reject these hypotheses when testing using the more conservative 95% condence
interval. As for the inference of the true parameters, considering the fact that the simulated
condence interval for each parameter is also conservative, the statistical signicance test for
each parameter based on the simulated condence interval is not likely to su¤er from over-
rejection.32
Table 8 presents the second stage estimation result for local bidders. It shows that a one-
unit increase in the MHz-pop of a license increases the mean of a local bidders stand-alone
value for the license by 30 to 43 cents. The increase is smaller for bidders with smaller eligibility
ratios eligi. This result says that bidders with small initial eligibility do not value a large MHz-
pop license as much as bidders with large initial eligibility. However, this result should not be
read as a causality relationship. It should be understood that the eligibility term in MHz-pope
accounts for some bidder heterogeneity that the other variables fail to capture.
The result also shows that the further away the licenses market is from a local bidders
location, the greater the negative e¤ect will be on the mean value of the license. If a license is
located one meter further from a bidders business, the bidder will value the license 66 cents to
one dollar less. The negative sign of the coe¢ cient was expected since a local bidder tends to
bid more aggressively for a license that covers its own location. It is not clear whether the area
32There are three sources of conservatism in the construction of the conservative CI. The two sources of
conservatism that the simulated CI and the conservative CI share are due to the two inequalities in
Pr(0 2 [bq=2; bq1 =2])  Pr([0; 0] 2 [bq=2; bq1 =2])  1   Pr(0 < bq=2)   Pr(0 > bq1 =2): The third
source of conservatism that only the conservative CI comes from the fact that its construction makes sure that
Pr(
0
< bq=2)  =2 and Pr(0 > bq1 =2)  =2. See PPHI (2006) pp 36-37 for more discussion.
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Table 8: Second Stage Estimation Results: Local Bidders
Mean ()
MHz-pope [0:300, 0:434]
Land Area (mi2) [ 6:031, 3:398]
Distance From Business Address (m) [ 1:036,  0:657]
Standard Deviation ()
MHz-pope [0:124, 0:232]
# [2:68 105, 3:16 105]
The estimated set was found by solving the minimization problem for randomly drawn initial
guesses using a regular search and simulated annealing algorithm for about 2000 times. 79
solutions were found. After this work was done, I ran a constrained minimization algorithm
repeatedly until the minimum and maximum value of each parameter does not change. In total
255 solutions were found.
Table 9: Second Stage Estimation Results: Global Bidders
Top 50 MSAs Other MSAs RSAs
Mean ()
MHz-pop 0:399 0:365 0:328
Land Area (mi2)  16:583
Small bidder dummy  5421:774
Variance (2)
MHz-pop 0:023 0:335
# 2:1 106
has a negative e¤ect or a positive e¤ect on the mean of a licenses value from the estimated
set. The estimated set also includes zero.
Figure 3 provides the graphical representation of the second stage estimation for local bid-
ders. The gure shows that the truncated normal distribution falls within the bounding distri-
butions at one point in the estimated set.
Table 9 presents the second stage estimation result for global bidders. For global bidders, I
used the midpoint in the estimated set of the complementarity coe¢ cients to construct lower
and upper bounds of the stand-alone values of a license, instead of the extreme points as in (9)
and (10). This is to reduce the computational burden of nding all solutions that minimize the
second stage sample criterion function in (14). The coe¢ cients of geocomple and travelcomple
used are 0:0138 and 2:458  10 3, respectively. To capture heterogeneity across the global
bidders, I included a small bidder dummy which takes the value of 1 if a global bidders
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Figure 3: Second Stage Estimation: Local Bidders
Note: The gure depicts the bounding distributions and the truncated standard normal distrib-
ution at point (0:355;  0:820;  0:810; 0:218; 2:72 105) which belongs to the estimated set in
Table 8.
winning collection contains less than 0.5% of the total MHz-pop sold. The coe¢ cient estimate
for this dummy variable implies that the small global bidders value each license 5; 422 dollars
less compared to the other global bidders.
Table 9 shows that global bidders value MHz-pop more for MSA licenses than RSA licenses.
A unit increase in the MHz-pop of a license increases a global bidders willingness-to-pay for the
license by 40 cents if the license is associated with one of the top 50 MSA markets, whereas only
by 32 cents with an RSA market. Assuming that these estimates correspond to the midpoints
of the interval estimates for the coe¢ cients, the results indicate that there is horizontal hetero-
geneity between global and local bidder groups. In general, local bidders have lower valuations
than global bidders, except for rural licenses in their region.
Areal has a negative e¤ect on the mean of the stand-alone value for global bidders. If a
CMA area increases by one square mile, global bidders will be willing to pay 16 dollars less on
average. The MHz-pop of a license increases the variance of the stand-alone value of a license;
this e¤ect is larger for MSA licenses.
Using the estimation results, I calculate the markups of winning bidders. The markup of a
winning bidder measures the di¤erence between the value of the winning collection of licenses
and the sum of its winning bids. As I do not recover the exact value of a collection of licenses for
a bidder, the exact markups cannot be estimated. Therefore, I consider the expected markups
by taking expectation with respect to the stand-alone values of licenses in a winning collection.
I require that the surplus from the winning collection is non-negative. Formally, the expected
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Table 10: Expected Mark-ups
Local Bidders Global Bidders
1st quartile 10.3 % 13.0 %
Median 25.8 % 30.8 %
3rd quartile 56.4 % 62.6 %
St. Dev. 26.0 % 29.3 %
11 out 76 local winners and 4 out of 21 global winners had zero probability that the value
of the winning package is greater than their payment. I set their markups as zero.
markup ratio Emi is dened as follows:
Emi  1 
P
l2Wi pi;l
EVi
; EVi = E
hbxWi +X
l2Wi
vi;l
 bxWi +X
l2Wi
vi;l 
X
l2Wi
pi;l
i
(16)
where xWi denotes the vector of (geocompleWi, travelcompleWi), Wi bidder is winning collec-
tion, and pi;l the winning bid for license l.
Note that Emi in (16) depends on the complementarities coe¢ cients b as well as the coe¢ -
cient estimates that govern the distribution of a licenses stand-alone value. Since the distribu-
tion of bidder valuations is only set-identied, Emi is also set-identied. Instead of estimating
bidder markups for each coe¢ cient estimate, I use the midpoint of the rst stage estimated
set for the complementarity coe¢ cients. The coe¢ cients of geocomple and travelcomple used
are 0:0138 and 2:458  10 3, respectively. I also use a point in the second stage estimated
set to calculate Emi for local bidders. The coe¢ cients for MHz-popeil; Distil; and Areal used
are 0:355;  0:820 and  0:810; respectively. For the coe¢ cient of MHz-popeil in the standard
deviation; 0:218 is used. This particular point is chosen because many points in the estimated
set are around this point. Table 10 presents summary statistics on Emi.
While the estimated markups are relatively high in general, the variation is quite large.
While many winning bidders have zero probability that the value of their winning collection is
greater than their payment, many bidders have more than 30% markups implying that they
only paid 70% of their value for the winning collection. The estimated markups are higher
for global bidders. The median for the global bidders is 31% whereas it is 26% for the local
bidders. This modest di¤erence in the markups between the two groups indicates that the
bidders were horizontally heterogenous because local bidders have higher valuations for rural
licenses in their region. It also suggests that the complementarities were not large enough to
convert this horizontal heterogeneity to vertical heterogeneity.
There can be several explanations for the relatively high expected markups compared to the
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bidder markups generally expected in single unit English auctions. First, since Emi measures
the expected markup of bidder i conditional on the value of bidder is winning collection being
greater than the price, this can be imputed to the large variance estimate in the second stage.
The large variance in the distribution of stand-alone values of a license implies that each bidders
di¤erent business plan was an important determinant of the protability of each license. The
absence of variables that would capture each bidders di¤erent business plan, such as each
bidders market position and existing spectrum holdings in each market, could be a cause of
the large variance estimate of the stand-alone value distribution. Another missing factor in the
second stage estimation, due to the lack of data, is the competition level of each market. These
missing determinants of a licenses value could be a source of the large variance of the winners
expected markups.
Second, the high bidder markups are consistent with the fact that the auction prices were
below private transaction prices for similar spectrum licenses. For example, in a private trans-
action, Verizon paid $2.85 per MHz-pop for the 10 and 20 MHz licenses in the 1.9 GHz PCS
frequency range, which cover in total a population of 73 million people in 22 key markets.33
It is true that it is hard to compare prices for di¤erent licenses in di¤erent frequency bands.
Di¤erent frequency bands imply di¤erent service production costs. Furthermore, these private
transactions included very important markets such as New York city and Los Angeles. How-
ever, the fact that private transaction prices are consistently higher than auction prices suggests
that bidders might have shaded their bids down to enjoy their oligopsony market power in the
presence of private information.
Third, the number of licenses far exceeded the number of bidders. Because the local bidders
valued the licenses that were close to their businesses and the complementarities are not large
enough to o¤set their strong preferences for only a small set of licenses around their location,
there were only a few bidders that were interested in each license. The estimation results show
that the global bidders valued the licenses across the US. This could induce global bidders to
bid for a large package of licenses to enjoy the realized complementarities. However, there were
only a few truly nationwide bidders in the auction. Auction theory implies that these large
global bidders would have strong incentives to split licenses at low prices rather than triggering
intensive competition among themselves.
33Also, Cingular paid $1.60 per MHz-pop to NextWave for 10 MHz licenses in the 1.9 GHz PCS frequency
range, which cover in total a population of 83 million people in 34 key markets. In Auction No. 35 held in 2001,
Verizon bid $5.79 per MHz-pop. The average price per MHz-pop in the auction was $4.37.
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7 Concluding Remarks
This paper proposes an empirical model and procedure to estimate bidder valuations in FCC
spectrum auctions. Given that there is no well-accepted model of bidding that captures the
complexity of the auction format, this paper takes an incomplete model approach by specifying
the relationship between the observed bidding behavior and the underlying parameters as a
correspondence rather than a function. As a result, only a set to which true parameters belong
is identied.
The empirical model of this paper starts from two behavioral assumptions that constitute
two revealed preference inequalities. They are consistent with rational behavior that should
arise towards the end of an auction. I develop an estimation procedure that generates a map
from the observed bidding behavior to a set of distributions of bidder valuations consistent
with the behavioral assumptions. A part of the procedure employs an estimator developed by
Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2006). I apply the empirical framework to a spectrum auction
held in 2006, labeled AWS-1.
Using the estimated distribution of bidder valuations, I rst test whether complementarities
exist among AWS-1 licenses. As expected, the estimation results reject the hypothesis of no
complementarities among AWS-1 licenses. This is consistent with many empirical studies that
found synergies among spectrum licenses.
I estimate bidder markups using the estimated distribution of values for a collection of
licenses. The results indicate that the expected markups of the winning bidders, conditional on
each winners prot being non-negative, are relatively high compared to single object auctions.
I argue that this result is consistent with the following observations: (i) the auction prices were
relatively low compared to private transaction prices for similar spectrum licenses and (ii) the
number of bidders compared to the number of licenses was small. This result suggests that
there were distortionary e¤ects of private information in the auction, and casts doubt about the
current auction formats ability to control strategic behavior of big bidders such as nationwide
cellular phone carriers.
An incomplete econometric model can achieve a higher level of generality, which is important
especially when committing to a particular model as a data generating process is likely to result
in specication error. For spectrum auctions, auction theory has not been able to characterize
an equilibrium in a general setting. Hence, there is little known about biddersbidding behavior.
Given this challenge, an incomplete model approach may be the only approach available for a
researcher vigilant about specication error. However, interpretation of results from a partially
identied model is less decisive compared to a point-identied model. Also one may face a
practical issue of nding multiple solutions to a minimization problem, especially when the
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criterion function is not linear in parameters.
The behavioral assumptions of this study may not use all the information available. For
example, the assumptions do not use information about a bidders value on a license if the
bidder bids on the license in an early round and remains the standing high bidder until the
auction ends. This is because the assumptions do not account for strategic bidding behavior that
can alter the equilibrium played and hence ignore noisy information in early rounds. Although
it is likely to be true that a bidders bidding behavior in early rounds contains noisy information
about the bidders value for licenses, the use of bids placed only on a small set of licenses in
late rounds reduces the variation that an empirical researcher needs. As a consequence, the
interval estimates for the complementarity coe¢ cients are wide, weakening policy conclusions
derived from them. Also, lack of data on important determinants of the value of a license for
a bidder, such as the competition level in each geographic wireless service market, led to large
variance estimates in the distribution of bidder valuations. For future work, I plan to explore
the possibilities of tightening the interval estimates on the complementarities by incorporating
more information missing from the behavioral assumptions. I also plan to collect data on
variables that captures the competition level of each market.
This paper allows for private information on the bidder-license specic values. Private
information in this form could be incorporated because (i) it enters the bidders surplus in
a linear fashion and (ii) the revealed preference inequalities and Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii
(2006) give rise to implementation of the xed e¤ect approach.
The econometric model in this paper does not allow for private information in the comple-
mentarities. Allowing for this form of private information is extremely challenging because the
dimension of private information equals the number of possible combinations, 2N   1, where N
denote the number of licenses for sale. There is neither an auction theory nor an econometric
technique that enables a researcher to explore this path. One can avoid this curse of dimen-
sionality by allowing private information to enter the bidders value as a bidder xed e¤ect
multiplied by the observed complementarities. In this case, one needs an estimation strategy
that can account for this unobserved structural error entering the value in a non-linear fashion.
I leave this challenge as future work.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3: Note that bq P ! q for each q since bq is on the boundary. This
is established by Pakes and Ishii (2006). Since we assume that bt0 P ! t0 and bt1 P ! t1, b P ! .
Also note that bh(t; ; ) = min hb(t; ; ); 0i2 + min hb(t; ; ); 0i2 is continuous in  for each
t. Hence, Qns(; ) is continuous in . I want to show that Qn2(;bn) converges uniformly
to Q(; ) in probability on   by verifying the su¢ cient conditions: pointwise convergence
and stochastic equicontinuity. I rst show that Qn2(;bn1)! Q(; ) in probability pointwise.
Note that
 bQnI (;bn) Q(; )  1ns
nsX
k=1
bh(tk; ;bn)  bh(tk; ; ) (A4)
+
1
ns
nsX
k=1
bh(tk; ; )  h(tk; ; )+
 1ns
nsX
k=1
h(tk; ; )  Eth(tk; ; )

The rst term captures the bias from the rst stage estimation. Since bh(tk; ; ) is continuous
in , and bn1 P ! , this term converges to zero in probability as n1  ! 1 . The second
term is the error from using an empirical distribution. As the empirical distribution converges
to the true distribution pointwise (as well as uniformly), the second term converges to zero in
probability as n2  ! 1. The last term represents the fact that the inequalities are sampled
only asymptotically. Given Assumption 4 (i) and that Q(; ) is nite on  , it satises a WLLN
and hence is op(1).
For stochastic equicontinuity, bQnI (;bn)  bQnI (0;bn)   bQnI (;bn)  bQnI (; )
+
 bQnI (; )  bQnI (0; )+  bQnI (0; )  bQnI (0;bn)
The rst and third term is op(1) for any ; 0 2   since bQn2(0; ) is continuous and bn1 P ! .
For the second term, the following holds, given continuity of bQnI in  and Assumption 3.
lim
!0
lim
nI!0

sup
2 
sup
02 
 bQnI (; )  bQnI (0; ) = 0
Hence,
n bQj(;bn)o is stochastic equicontinuous. The second part follows from Proposition 5
(b) in Manski and Tamer (2002).
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